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Family policy has gained importance internationally as 
a policy field since the mid-1990s (Mätzke and Ostner, 
2010), and research is increasingly concerned with 
explaining changes, outcomes and future directions in 
family policy. Family policies have conceptually been 
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integrated less systematically into mainstream welfare 
state theories than other traditional fields such as unem-
ployment and pension policies. One difficulty seems to 
be that, within the same welfare state setting, family 
policy combines different ideas and aims. An illustra-
tive example for such tendencies is recent family policy 
reforms in Germany, which included the commitment 
to boosting childcare provision to relieve family care 
responsibilities as well as the introduction of a child-
care premium for stay-at-home mothers. This article 
argues that, in order to describe and comprehensively 
map countries’ family policy profiles and changes over 
time, a fresh analytical perspective and new tools for 
the measurement of family policies are required.
The concepts of familization and defamilization 
have often been used in comparative welfare state 
research to discuss how countries address the issues 
of financial and care dependencies between family 
members, and attempts have been made to measure 
the concepts used to describe the differences between 
countries. This article congruently argues that the 
familization and defamilization concepts can be use-
ful analytical tools for comparing family policy 
across welfare states. The multi-dimensional frame-
work that the concepts offer seems suitable for ana-
lysing a policy field with opposing policy aims, such 
as supporting mothers’ labour market participation 
and boosting fertility. However, definitions of fami-
lization and defamilization in previous studies vary 
widely, and only a few approaches combine rigorous 
conceptualization with sound operationalization. 
Compromises are either made on the conceptual 
side, narrowing de-/familization to sub-dimensions, 
or on the measurement side by omitting central 
aspects of the concepts in their translation into 
empirical indicators. This has led to some confusion 
and arbitrariness around the terms and their use in 
empirical studies. The aim of this article is hence 
threefold: first, to derive a conceptual framework 
based on the comprehensive review of theoretical 
literature on de-/familization; second, to compare 
previous empirical approaches towards the measure-
ment of de-/familization; and third, to provide a sug-
gestion for the operationalization of the concepts, 
which allows for conducting empirical analyses of 
the complexities and dynamics of policy interven-
tion in family responsibilities.
The concepts of familization and 
defamilization
Since the initial formulation of different ‘worlds of 
welfare’, a growing body of research has compared 
welfare states by the extent to which they support the 
‘familization’ and ‘defamilization’ of their citizens, 
roughly defined as the degree of support of individu-
als’ independence from family relationships. While 
defamilization is primarily the focus in this field of 
research, familization is often treated as a sub-
dimension or the counter-pole to defamilization. The 
academic debate around the defamilization concept 
can be described in three main phases, which may be 
labelled the emergence, consolidation and critical 
assessment phases. In the first phase, the term was 
introduced in two articles published in the same year 
by McLaughlin and Glendinning (1994) and Lister 
(1994) as part of the long-standing discussion within 
feminist literature on the position of women in wel-
fare states (see, for example, Hernes, 1987; Lewis, 
1992; Lister, 1990; Nelson, 1990; O’Connor, 1993; 
Orloff, 1993).1 In the second phase, the concept was 
taken up by mainstream welfare state theorists in the 
reformulation of their earlier analyses of social pol-
icy regimes, most prominently by Esping-Andersen 
(1999) and Korpi (2000), who did not explicitly refer 
to the term ‘defamilization’. The third ongoing phase 
is characterized both by a critical conceptual assess-
ment of defamilization, in which different sub-
dimensions of the initial concept are highlighted, 
and by empirical application. The remainder of this 
section discusses the main aspects of each of the 
three phases in more detail.
Emergence phase
A focal point in the primarily feminist discussion that 
has led to the emergence of the concept of defamiliza-
tion is the critical examination of Esping-Andersen’s 
(1990) analysis of welfare states and its central con-
cept of decommodification. For example, Lister 
(1990), Lewis (1992), Orloff (1993) and O’Connor 
(1993) have argued, respectively, that gender-specific 
aspects such as dependencies between spouses ought 
to be included in the analysis of welfare states. With 
reference to the approach of Esping-Andersen and 
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other welfare state theorists, Orloff (1993) writes, ‘Its 
concepts are explicitly gender-neutral – but the cate-
gories of workers, state–market relations, stratifica-
tion, citizenship and decommodification are based on 
a male standard; moreover, gender relations and their 
effects are ignored’ (p. 307). As to the gendered impli-
cations of the decommodification concept, she argues 
that most women are not (fully) commodified and 
thus do not fulfil the precondition to benefit directly 
from a high level of decommodification through wel-
fare states. While Esping-Andersen (1990) stresses 
the equalizing impact of decommodification, he 
ignores its impact on gender inequalities. Because 
women are predominantly the ones held responsible 
for care work in their families, they often face recon-
ciliation issues with work in the labour market. As a 
consequence of their limited access to labour market 
income, women are often economically dependent on 
a male earner (e.g. Lister, 1990). Furthermore, non-
standard labour market involvement can restrain eligi-
bility to welfare benefits since these are often linked 
to continuous employment histories. The aspect of 
economic dependence is stressed in Lister’s (1994) 
definition of defamilization:
Arguably, the dimension of decommodification also 
needs to be complemented by what we might call 
‘defamilization’, if it is to provide a rounded measure 
of economic independence. Welfare regimes might 
then also be characterized according to the degree to 
which individual adults can uphold a socially 
acceptable standard of living, independently of family 
relationships, either through paid work or through the 
social security system. (p. 37)
McLaughlin and Glendinning (1994) propose a more 
general concept of defamilization which does not as 
explicitly stress the aim of economic independence: 
‘[D]e-familization is constituted by those provisions 
and practices which vary the extent to which well-
being is dependent on “our” relation to the (patriar-
chal) family’ (p. 65). They furthermore stress that 
defamilization is not only about gendered but also 
about intergenerational dependencies:
The issue is not whether people are completely 
‘de-familized’ but rather the extent to which packages 
of legal and social provisions have altered the balance 
of power between men and women, between dependents 
and non-dependents, and hence the terms and 
conditions under which people engage in familial or 
caring arrangements. (McLaughlin and Glendinning, 
1994: 66)
The idea that care must be regarded as a reciprocal 
relationship, which is stressed again in more recent 
work on defamilization, is already spelled out in this 
conceptualization. Hence, at the time of its emer-
gence, the concept of defamilization captures not 
only economic independence and the independence 
from care responsibility but also the freedom to 
choose who cares.
Consolidation phase
As argued above, the second phase is characterized 
by an integration of the concept of defamilization 
into the mainstream welfare state theory. However, 
looking at Esping-Andersen’s (1999)2 definition of 
defamilization more closely reveals that only a par-
tial integration of the concept was achieved:
The concept of de-familization parallels the concept of 
de-commodification; in fact for women de-familization 
is generally a precondition for their capacity to 
‘commodify themselves’ (Orloff, 1993). Hence, de- 
familization would indicate the degree to which social 
policy (or perhaps markets) render women autonomous 
to become ‘commodified’, or to set up independent 
households, in the first place. (p. 51)
In this definition, enabling commodification (of 
women) appears to be the main, if not the only, aim 
of defamilization.3 Although not making use of the 
defamilization concept explicitly, Korpi (2000) takes 
up the ideas it conveys in his characterization of dif-
ferent family support models of the welfare state 
defined along the dimensions of general family sup-
port and dual-earner support. Korpi refers to the 
wider notion of gender inequalities in agency (and 
not exclusively to commodification), but his main 
focus is still on policies affecting the gendered pat-
terns of labour market inclusion. Consequently, 
Korpi’s (2000) typology is based on ‘broadly con-
ceived policy institutions likely to be of major rele-
vance for gendered agency inequality in terms of 
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labor force participation’ (p. 143). Hence, while inte-
grating the ideas from feminist researchers into the 
core discussion of welfare states, both Korpi and 
Esping-Andersen focus on the gender aspect of 
labour market integration.
Critical assessment phase
In more recent years, which may be regarded as a third 
phase in the discussion of defamilization, various 
authors have criticised this narrowing of the perspec-
tive on defamilization to questions of employment. 
Two types of criticism can be distinguished in this 
phase. One perspective takes current policy changes 
and reform efforts as its starting point for scrutinizing 
the different facets of defamilization, and the other 
calls for a reconsideration of the defamilization con-
cept from a more theoretical point of view. Both 
strands, however, reach similar conclusions, condemn-
ing that defamilization has become limited to the 
aspect of commodification (see Kröger, 2011; Leitner 
et al., 2004; Leitner and Lessenich, 2007; Lewis, 2001; 
Lewis and Giullari, 2005; Ostner, 2003).
Several authors have used the notions of de-/
familization in their critical discussions of the policy 
reforms which have been taking place in many 
European countries since the 1990s. The centrepiece 
of the reforms was strategies for boosting female 
labour market participation. The overarching aim, as 
is also spelt out in the European Employment 
Strategy, is to strengthen the competitiveness of the 
European Union in a global perspective. Where such 
policy reforms are assessed against the categories 
implicit to the defamilization concept, it becomes 
apparent that the policies mainly address economic 
but not care dependencies (e.g. Leitner et al., 2004; 
Lewis, 2001; Lewis and Giullari, 2005). Conflicting 
reform aims and outcomes arise where support for 
the commodification of women does not include 
support for easing care responsibilities. Employment-
oriented reforms have often implied that the social 
rights previously granted to women based on their 
status of dependency on a male earner were cut (e.g. 
financial aid for widows) without resolving care 
dependencies (Leitner et al., 2004). An underpinning 
issue is that, although increasing female employ-
ment is arguably inseparable from it, eradicating 
gender inequality is not usually considered to be an 
equal aim in European policy reform (Lewis and 
Giullari, 2005: 83). These aspects illustrate that pol-
icy strategies described as defamilizing can entail 
politically controversial ideas and conflicting out-
comes for individuals.
The second strand of critical discussion in this 
‘third phase’ of conceptual development is more con-
cerned with the usefulness of the defamilization con-
cept for comparing and typologizing welfare states. 
Kröger (2011), for example, claims that defamilization 
causes ‘conceptual confusion’ (p. 429) mainly because 
it mashes up distinct dimensions of economic and 
social/emotional independence. Unlike Leitner and 
Lessenich (2007), who define sub-dimensions of the 
defamilization concept in order to include social/emo-
tional aspects, Kröger suggests reserving the term 
‘defamilization’ for the economic dimension and to 
use the concept of ‘dedomestication’ for the social/
emotional component. By contrast, other authors focus 
entirely on the economic dimension. Bambra’s (2004) 
approach stresses the origin of the defamilization con-
cept in the feminist research tradition and defines it in 
terms of ‘factors concerned with female freedom from 
the family, rather than the freedom of the family’ 
(p. 204). Saxonberg (2013), too, highlights the con-
cept’s roots in analysing gender equality but criticises 
the concept’s vagueness and proposes replacing it with 
the ‘degenderization’ concept. Daly (2011a, 2011b), 
on the other hand, argues that familization is a useful 
concept to describe policy effects, but that the defami-
lization concept is misleading. Arguing that ‘“famili-
zation” is the original orientation of family policy’ 
(Daly, 2011a: 88), she suggests that defamilization is 
inappropriately based on a static concept of the family 
and that it frames shifts in policy in negative terms 
with the ‘de’ prefix (Daly, 2011b: 7). Daly’s preferred 
contrasting notion to familization is ‘individualiza-
tion’, which conveys policies’ focus on the individual 
rather than a collective, as is implied in the term ‘fam-
ily’. Alongside the approaches suggesting alternative 
concepts to defamilization, other research has further 
developed the sub-dimensions included in the initial 
approach of McLaughlin and Glendinning. This has an 
advantage over newer suggestions which trade in the 
multi-dimensionality of the initial concept in attempt-
ing improved clarity. Leitner and Lessenich’s (2007) 
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approach, for example, highlights the need to specify 
the roles of care giver and receiver within the concep-
tual framework for defamilization. Saraceno and Keck 
(2010) have also used the defamilization concept for 
describing state provision of individualized social 
rights that reduce family responsibility and depend-
ence. However, they assume that the opposite pole to 
defamilization, ‘familialism’, can either be created by 
the lack of state provision of services and financial 
support (‘familialism by default’) or by active state 
support to individuals’ family care (‘supported famil-
ialism’). This categorization comes close to the one 
proposed by Leitner (2003), who applies the two-
dimensional approach of familization and defamiliza-
tion in describing state support and/or lack of care 
provision and financial incentives for family care. 
Both the studies by Leitner (2003) and Saraceno and 
Keck (2010) make the particular contribution of con-
sidering intergenerational dependencies, the rarely 
regarded dimension captured with the defamilization 
concept, alongside gender dependencies.
Patterns of familizing and 
defamilizing policies
As discussed in the previous section, the almost 
20 years of theoretical debate around familization 
and defamilization entail different perspectives on 
the meanings of the concepts. Carving out common 
denominators in the literature, we distinguish the 
following sub-dimensions: (a) gender and/or genera-
tion, (b) reciprocity of care and (c) statutory policy 
and/or state and market provision. In general, we dif-
ferentiate between the policy level and the level of 
expected outcomes (see also Leitner, 2003; Saraceno 
and Keck, 2010). At the policy level, we regard 
familizing and defamilizing policies which differ 
from country to country. These policy configurations 
are expected to produce ideal-typical patterns of out-
comes with regard to gender-specific and intergen-
erational dependencies such as familialism and 
defamilialism or individualism, which will differ 
accordingly at the country level. We share Daly’s 
(2011b) preference for using the concept of individ-
ualism rather than that of defamilialism (see discus-
sion below). We acknowledge that patterns of 
familialism and individualism result not only from 
the differences in policies but are also expressions of 
attitudinal and cultural differences (see, for example, 
Pfau-Effinger, 2004). Although we do not focus on 
such differences in the empirical part of this article, 
we suggest that, analytically, attitudinal and cultural 
differences should be considered alongside familiz-
ing and defamilizing policies for categorizing coun-
tries. Hence, in the next two sections, we present our 
definition of familizing and defamilizing policies 
before we discuss the expected patterns of outcomes. 
We assume that single policies can be characterized 
by their impact on familialism and individualism, 
but that, for the description of countries, the combi-
nation of the different policies has to be considered. 
We argue that policy-level analysis is central in the 
field of family policy for two reasons. First, only by 
taking into account single policies, the contradic-
tions between and opposing directions of policies 
may be identified. Second, policy change and poten-
tial divergences from ‘path dependencies’ can easily 
go unnoticed by looking at the country level and 
may be addressed more readily with a policy-level 
perspective.
Defamilizing policies
We define defamilizing policies as welfare state provi-
sions (social policies and regulations) that reduce care 
and financial responsibilities and dependencies 
between family members. It is hence a concept for 
describing policies in terms of their expected outcomes. 
We follow the approaches from above that define defa-
milization as capturing policy outcomes in terms of 
gender-specific as well as intergenerational relation-
ships; describing the extent to which policies relieve 
family members from their gender- and generation-
specific dependency roles. This definition goes beyond 
other approaches, such as Bambra’s (2004) reading of 
the defamilization concept and Saxonberg’s (2013) 
alternative concept of degenderization, which omit the 
intergenerational aspect. Defamilizing policies can, in 
principle, be provided by the state, the voluntary sector 
and ‘the market’ (i.e. commercial providers). In our 
definition, we focus on regulations defined by statutory 
bodies because we assume that these cover a substan-
tial part of family policy provision and serve as a good 
basis for international comparisons.
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In the present understanding, free public child-
care is a prime example of a policy with a clear defa-
milizing effect because it reduces family 
dependencies for parents to care for their children 
and for children to rely on their parents as carers.4 
We also consider parental leave policies as defami-
lizing as they may reduce family dependencies by 
allowing employed parents of young children to 
maintain high labour market attachment, guarantee-
ing the return to their jobs after a given period of 
full-time family care. This stands in contrast to 
Saraceno and Keck (2010) who stress that parental 
leave supports certain family members in keeping up 
their care responsibilities and categorize it as ‘sup-
ported familialism’. We argue that the defamilizing 
effect depends on the design of parental leave poli-
cies. Empirical research has found that long unpaid 
leave, in contrast to short periods of leave paid at 
high replacement rates, incentivize parents (moth-
ers) to stay at home to care for their child (e.g. 
Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2013; Han et al., 2009). 
Therefore, we regard only policies granting rather 
short, well-paid absence from employment as defa-
milizing and other leave policies as familizing. 
Similar to parental leave policies, regulations that 
support employed individuals in taking periods of 
leave to care for their frail or sick relatives can be 
considered defamilizing. A further example of a 
defamilizing policy is free public care for older peo-
ple because it implies that care responsibility does 
not remain with family members. In these cases of 
child and elderly care, the meaning of defamilizing 
policies resembles what Kröger (2011) defines as 
‘dedomestication’ by social policies. Some scholars 
have noted the theoretical possibility of defamiliza-
tion via the market in addition to statutory policies 
(see Esping-Andersen, 1999), for example, in the 
form of market-based care provision for children and 
older people. In fact, in most countries, care services 
are not exclusively provided by the public sector but 
also by non-profit and for-profit providers, which is 
sometimes referred to as ‘welfare mix’ (Bode, 2003). 
However, it is difficult to define the conceptual 
boundaries of market-based defamilizing policies, 
such as childcare provision, not least because often 
‘markets’ provide state-subsidized services and con-
tain third sector providers. Hence, in contrast to 
other studies (e.g. Leitner, 2003), we exclude mar-
ket-based provision from our definition of defami-
lizing policies to avoid such conceptual difficulties.5 
Instead, we argue that looking at publicly regulated 
care provision provides a good comparative picture 
of different welfare state strategies, that is, repre-
senting systems with different degrees of statutory 
involvement. This perspective also covers services 
organized on the basis of the subsidiarity principle, 
for example, in Germany (Bode, 2003), to the extent 
that they are regulated and funded by public bodies. 
If welfare states leave it up to individuals to arrange 
their family care, either privately or in the market, 
this means a lack of defamilizing policies. This is in 
line with the idea that some welfare states are more 
‘hands off’ or ‘liberal’ than others in certain policy 
areas.
Familizing policies
Familizing policies are defined as social policies or 
regulations that foster dependencies among family 
members by actively lowering their negative social 
and economic consequences (also see Leitner, 2003; 
Leitner and Lessenich, 2007, Saraceno and Keck, 
2010), such as women’s financial dependence on a 
breadwinner, children’s dependence on their parents’ 
care and elderly people’s dependence on their adult 
children. It is important to acknowledge that we do 
not understand defamilization and familization as 
polar opposites on a linear continuum. Many welfare 
states feature defamilizing and familizing policies at 
the same time (e.g. public childcare and generous 
family benefits). Likewise, countries with few defa-
milizing policies are not necessarily rich in familiz-
ing policies. Familizing policies comprise all cash 
payments that support family care at home. Among 
these are child benefits and family allowances, as 
well as home care allowances that are paid condi-
tionally on parents’ (mothers’) home care for a 
dependent child, and payments that are conditional 
on home care for older people. Tax rebates granted 
for family members are considered to have a similar 
effect. Both sets of policies reduce the negative eco-
nomic consequences associated with family depend-
ency. Parental leave regulations are considered 
familizing when they are granted with no wage 
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replacement or payment at a low level and for long 
periods. The familizing effect here is that the nega-
tive social consequences of family dependencies are 
reduced with the legal status supporting the accept-
ability of mothers staying at home for care (see dis-
cussion above). A further factor categorized as 
familizing policies are legal regulations for financial 
obligations between parents and their children. 
Where such regulations imply that parents’ financial 
obligation towards their children lasts for the entire 
dependency years (e.g. as child-related benefits) or 
beyond, strong familization can be assumed. 
Likewise, the statutory regulation of adult children’s 
obligations to care for their elderly parents (finan-
cially) strengthens dependencies among them.
Ideal-typical outcomes of policy 
configurations
Based on the definitions of defamilizing and familiz-
ing policies, we can derive expectations about ideal-
typical patterns of policy outcomes for how 
individual family members tend to structure their 
family dependencies.6 Figure 1 illustrates the con-
ceptual range of outcomes from constellations of 
defamilizing and familizing policies in a four-field 
matrix. In essence, similar to other approaches, we 
assume that combinations of strong/weak defamiliz-
ing policies with strong/weak familizing policies in 
welfare states produce typical patterns of family 
relationships.
Our proposal draws on existing typologies on 
familization and defamilization. Suggesting a similar 
matrix, Leitner (2003) categorizes four ideal types of 
outcomes as (a) defamilialism, (b) implicit familial-
ism, (c) explicit familialism and (d) optional familial-
ism based on the policy constellations of weak/ 
strong defamilization and weak/strong familization. 
Saraceno and Keck (2010) and Keck and Saraceno 
(2012), on the other hand, distinguish three types: (a) 
defamilization, (b) familialism by default and (c) sup-
ported familialism as typical constellations. Across 
approaches, the category of familialism seems rela-
tively undisputed. Likewise, defamilialism appears in 
both studies. Our model, however, makes important 
additions. First, we replace ‘defamilialism’ with ‘indi-
vidualism’ following Daly’s (2011b) suggestion. In 
this reading, reducing gender-related and intergenera-
tional dependencies through statutory support to indi-
viduals fosters individualism, but is not equal to a 
‘family-hostile’ environment. Second, our approach 
goes further than previous ones in that it assumes two 
respective possible outcomes for individuals’ organi-
zation of family life where both familization and defa-
milization are weak or both are strong. Accordingly, 
the combination of strong familization and strong 
defamilization, labelled as ‘optional’ familialism by 
Leitner (2003), should at the same time allow for 
‘optional individualism’. In this constellation of statu-
tory family policies, both outcomes are possible: 
stronger reliance on family members on the one hand 
or weaker dependencies on the other hand. At the 
Figure 1. Conceptual dimensions for describing welfare state intervention in family responsibilities and 
dependencies.
See Leitner (2003) and Saraceno and Keck (2010) for similar classifications.
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opposite pole, the provision of both weak familizing 
policies and weak defamilizing policies would create 
a pattern of implicit individualism alongside ‘implicit 
familialism’ (Leitner, 2003) or what is called ‘famil-
ialism by default’ by Saraceno and Keck (2010). Here, 
and in the case of optional familialism or individual-
ism, the distinguishing criterion is not the degree of 
familizing and defamilizing policies but other factors 
such as attitudinal and cultural differences across wel-
fare states (Bahle, 2008; Kangas and Rostgaard, 2007; 
Pfau-Effinger, 2004). Labelled as ‘cultural legacies’, 
the diagonal line in the graph illustrates that the organ-
ization of family dependencies at the household level 
is influenced by normative factors that lie beyond the 
mere effects of policies. This means that the direction 
in which countries pull on this dimension (more 
towards optional individualism or more towards 
optional familialism) is to a certain extent defined by 
predominant family ideals in terms of gender and 
intergenerational relations. Countries where no clear 
pattern of statutory familizing and defamilizing fam-
ily policies prevails can differ in terms of the extent to 
which individuals and families fall back to familialist 
solutions for finances and care or to ‘individualist’ 
solutions, for example, in outsourcing family depend-
encies to market providers. However, it should also be 
noted that ‘cultural legacies’ do not constitute a factor 
that is independent from the design of family policies. 
Certainly, culture and policies are interrelated in a 
much more complex way than may be acknowledged 
in a simplifying graph like Figure 1. The aim of the 
presented model is to provide one possible framework 
for interpreting the differences in countries’ family 
policy constellations and for formulating expectations 
about differences in outcomes.
An evaluation of previous 
measures
Having developed a conceptual understanding of 
familization and defamilization at the policy level 
and of possible country-level outcomes, we now turn 
to evaluating previous empirical approaches. This 
section evaluates the studies’ choices of indicators 
against a set of criteria that define the desirable fea-
tures of comparative indicators (for an earlier over-
view, see Lohmann 2009). The criteria are the 
measurement of institutional factors, the availability 
for many countries and repeated measurement. The 
following evaluation will demonstrate the variety of 
indicators measuring similar constructs and the prob-
lems associated with them. This is based on the 
assumption that the comparison of familizing and 
defamilizing policies across countries requires rigid 
operationalization of the concepts, which should ide-
ally meet the following criteria. First, although it is 
usually more difficult to gather information on insti-
tutional factors (e.g. policies that support mother’s 
employment) than information on the assumed out-
come of such factors (e.g. the female employment 
rate), the former are preferable because they do not 
require that a high degree of covariation is assumed 
between policies and outcomes. This assumption is 
not only critical because it may be wrong, but first 
and foremost because in many cases of international 
comparison the assumption equals the hypothesis to 
be tested (see, for example, Bambra, 2004). For 
instance, the question of whether defamilizing poli-
cies have an impact on women’s labour market par-
ticipation cannot be answered using the female 
employment rate as a proxy for institutional factors 
because it is part of the concept to be explained. 
Furthermore, using outcomes as measures for institu-
tional factors restricts the options for testing alterna-
tive hypotheses like the influence of attitudes towards 
female employment. Second, because country-level 
measures are often compiled for use in macro- and 
multi-level regression models to which the small-n-
problem is inherent (Ebbinghaus, 2005), availability 
for many countries is a desirable characteristic of 
comparative indicators (usually at least all European 
Union (EU)–Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and non-EU–OECD 
countries). Third, stability and change can only be 
captured if measures are surveyed on a regular basis 
(see, for example, Gauthier, 2002). Even if the 
defined criteria are ideal requirements that will be 
difficult to satisfy fully for any measure, they provide 
a framework against which the quality and the prob-
lems of the different indicators used to measure fami-
lizing and defamilizing policies can be evaluated. 
Not least, the criteria set a standard for the develop-
ment of new measures of the concepts as well as for 
new attempts of compiling family policy data. In the 
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following subsections, the choice of indicators in pre-
vious studies is discussed (section ‘Previously used 
indicators’) and their empirical approaches are 
assessed (section ‘Comparison of indices’). Studies 
considered in the evaluation (a) contain some theo-
retical discussion of familization and/or defamiliza-
tion or closely related concepts, (b) suggest an 
operationalization and (c) use the measure(s) in the 
analysis of a larger set of countries.
Previously used indicators
Despite the long-standing discussion of the familiza-
tion and defamilization concepts (see section ‘The 
concepts of familization and defamilization’), there 
is still only one proposal for a comprehensive ‘defa-
milization index’ (Bambra, 2004). A number of 
researchers have, however, proposed indices for 
related concepts which we also include in our dis-
cussion. Other approaches have opted to analyse sin-
gle indicators to illustrate country differences in the 
sub-dimensions of familization and defamilization. 
Many of the studies considered here use indicators 
that come closer to the idea of ‘defamilization’ than 
to that of ‘familization’. However, some attempt is 
usually made to distinguish between different dimen-
sions of de-/familization through welfare state activ-
ity. Table 1 provides an overview of the indicators 
used in the discussed studies. There are indicators in 
four different categories. As indicated, several stud-
ies provide measures of two different dimensions. 
While Esping-Andersen (1999) explicitly speaks of 
defamilizing and familizing factors, Korpi (2000) 
distinguishes the dimensions of dual-earner and gen-
eral family support, combining different aspects of 
leave policies, provisions of childcare, home help for 
the elderly, child allowances and family tax benefits. 
The ‘dual-earner support’ dimension resembles the 
concept of defamilizing policies, while the ‘general 
family support’ one is closer to the idea of familizing 
policies.7 A similar operationalization is used by 
Ferrarini (2006) who refers to Korpi’s approach. 
Korpi et al. (2013) also draw on the initial idea of 
dual-earner/traditional family support, differentiat-
ing between ‘traditional family’, ‘market-oriented’ 
and ‘earner–carer’ models of welfare support, and 
also considering policies that support (temporary) 
‘dual-carer’ arrangements (paternal care). The ‘tra-
ditional family’ dimension largely matches an idea 
of familizing policies, while the ‘earner–carer’ 
dimension adheres to the concept of defamilizing 
policies. Following our approach, Korpi et al.’s 
‘market-oriented’ dimension could imply defamiliz-
ing or familizing policies. Gornick and Meyers 
(2003) provide several indices on policy measures 
(early childhood education and care, schooling 
schedules, family leave, working time regulation) 
that support an ‘earner–carer model’ in which par-
ents will be able to equally share economic and care 
responsibilities.8 While this conceptualization comes 
close to the outcome that strong defamilizing poli-
cies would have, the contrasting male breadwinner–
female carer model resembles one with dominating 
familizing policies. By contrast, using only meas-
ures of defamilization, Bambra’s (2004) approach is 
one-dimensional. Similarly, Mandel and Shalev 
(2009) draw on the defamilization concept, meas-
ured as both the enrolment rates of children in public 
childcare and weeks of maternity leave granted, 
which could, however, be said to convey aspects of 
both familizing and defamilizing policies. Only a 
few of the studies considered make the distinction 
between familization and defamilization explicit, 
constructing indicators for each dimension. Looking 
at the policies directed at the caring function of the 
family, Leitner (2003) defines two indicators for 
familization (paid parental leave and cash transfers 
to older people) and two for defamilization (child-
care coverage and institutional care for older peo-
ple). Saraceno and Keck (2010) use child allowances, 
child-related tax allowances and legal age thresholds 
ending parents’ financial obligations as measures of 
‘familialism by default’. Effective maternity and 
parental leave in weeks and level of compensation 
were used as indicators of ‘supported familialism’ in 
their study and childcare coverage rates as a measure 
of ‘defamilization’. In addition, Saraceno and Keck 
use a range of indicators to consider responsibilities 
towards older family members: service provision for 
elder care (provided by the state or the market) for 
distinguishing defamilization and supporting famil-
ialism, and conditionality of financial support pro-
vided to the elderly and level of minimum pension 
for measuring defamilization versus familialism by 
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default. Focusing on care dependencies, Kröger 
(2011) uses the time coverage of care services as 
hours per week, the legal right to childcare, the pro-
portion of net costs for childcare in family income 
and the child–staff ratios for constructing a ‘dedo-
mestication’ indicator. Given the wide variety of 
theoretical approaches, it is still noticeable how 
many similarities there are between the indicators 
used. The next step will show which are the most 
widely used indicators and how their country rank-
ing outcomes compare across the studies.
Comparison of indices
Table 1 shows which indicators are used in the 11 
studies considered. Information on maternity and 
parental leave regulations and on childcare coverage 
is used in more than half of the studies. Where used, 
indicators for the provision of childcare are assumed 
to relieve mothers from caring responsibilities. 
Assumptions around the impact of maternity/paren-
tal leave policies, on the other hand, are not unani-
mous. For example, while Gornick and Meyers 
(2003: 101) as well as Korpi (2000) interpret leave 
policies as supporting (female) labour market par-
ticipation, Leitner (2003: 359f) argues that parental 
leave policies support the caring function of the 
family.9
As shown in Table 1, the bulk of indicators in the 
considered studies measures institutional factors 
rather than outcomes. Drawing on institutional indi-
cators seems to have become common practice, and 
the outcome indicators describing family life and 
female employment used by Esping-Andersen 
(1999), on one hand, and Bambra (2004), on the other 
hand, have not been applied in any other study con-
sidered here. Only when it comes to measuring care 
provision for children and older people, given data 
limitations, can comparative scholars more often 
seem to revert to using outcome measures. Indicators 
which cover aspects of intergenerational dependen-
cies can be found in studies by Esping-Andersen 
(1999), Leitner (2003) and Saraceno and Keck 
(2010). Esping-Andersen reports information on 
home care coverage and the share of elderly and 
young unemployed individuals who live with their 
families. The latter, however, are outcome indicators. 
In addition to the regulation of payment for elderly 
care, Leitner uses the percentage of home help ser-
vices as a measure, which is also an outcome indica-
tor. Saraceno and Keck use information on minimum 
pensions and cash for care payments as well as on the 
share of people over 65 years in residential and home-
based care, the latter of which would also count as an 
outcome indicator. Finally, Kröger (2011) uses child-
care take-up rates, average hours of attendance and 
child–staff ratios (by observation rather than by regu-
lation) to describe state support for care dependen-
cies. All of these indicators can be considered 
outcome measures.10
The comparison shows that there is a core group 
of seven countries which is covered in all of the stud-
ies considered: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Eight further countries, Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway and the United 
States, are included in nine of the studies.11 It is 
likely that the limited availability of and access to 
data are severe obstacles to broadening the country 
sample. Issues of data availability will be considered 
in more detail in section ‘Discussion’.
In the discussion of the theoretical and methodo-
logical foundations of existing approaches to meas-
ure defamilization, familization and related concepts, 
we have pointed out differences besides some com-
monalities. A crucial question is how such differ-
ences are reflected at the level of substantial results, 
namely, if countries are ranked similarly despite 
using different measures. Given the wide use of 
country rankings or scores in league tables, or as 
input for macro or multi-level analyses on the out-
comes of family policies across countries, evidence 
on the robustness of rankings using different 
approaches seems crucial. In our comparison, we 
focus on measures of defamilization and related con-
cepts such as dual-earner support or dedomestica-
tion, because only a few studies provide measures of 
familization for a large sample of countries. Table 2 
shows the country rankings of indicators from eight 
different studies (Bambra, 2004; Ferrarini, 2006; 
Gornick et al., 1997; Gornick and Meyers, 2003; 
Korpi, 2000; Korpi et al., 2013; Kröger, 2011; 
Mandel and Shalev, 2009). Some of the studies dis-
cussed above have been left out as they do not cover 
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crucial countries or do not provide index values 
which can be brought into a rank order. In total, we 
used information on 13 countries (with the exception 
of two studies which only cover 11 of these coun-
tries). The table provides rank orders for all studies, 
information on the mean rank and the standard devi-
ation (SD) of the rank across all studies. Looking at 
the mean rank and the SD, we can see that especially 
at the top or the bottom of the overall ranking coun-
tries are placed rather similarly in most studies. 
Sweden, Denmark or Finland is ranked at the top in 
most of the studies, while at the bottom we find 
either the United States or Australia. The similarity 
of country ranks across studies is reflected in a rather 
low SD. It is particularly low in the countries that we 
find consistently at the top or the bottom, but it is 
also rather low for Germany and the Netherlands. 
However, looking in more detail at where countries 
are ranked, there are even differences between the 
similar scores. For example, Kröger (2011) ranks the 
United States in ninth place, while it ranks 12 or 13 
in all other studies. For children aged 3–5 years, 
Gornick et al. (1997) rank Sweden in fourth place, 
which contrasts with most other studies where it is 
ranked 1 or 2. This could reflect the different theo-
retical perspectives, but nonetheless is surprising 
given the general focus on policies for relieving indi-
viduals from family responsibilities. The most 
inconsistent overall results were found for Norway 
(SD = 2.9). According to Gornick et al. (1997), in 
particular with regard to policies that support the 
employment of mothers with children aged 3 years 
and above, Norway is among the least supportive 
countries (rank 11). In contrast, it performs second 
best in Bambra’s (2004) defamilization index and 
Ferrarini’s (2006) index. We cannot rule out that the 
different data sources or years of data collection 
explain these deviating results, but it seems more 
likely that differences in the basic conceptualization 
and, moreover, in the choice of indicators explain the 
variation across studies. The previously discussed 
Table 1 shows that Ferrarini’s indicator only reflects 
leave policies, while Bambra adds outcome indica-
tors of female employment and gender pay gaps. In 
Table 2. Country rankings using different family policy/defamilization indexes.




SE 3 4 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2.0 1.0
DK 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 3 5 1 1 2 2.0 1.2
FI 1 5 4 3 5 5 5 4 3 3 8 4 4.2 1.7
NO 6 11 10 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 7 3 5.1 2.9
FR 5 1 1 5 7 8 7 5 9 6 6 5 5.4 2.4
BE 4 6 5 6 6 9 6 8 11 5 5 6 6.4 2.0
IT 8 2 6 8 – – – 9 6 8 – 8 6.9 2.2
NL 10 9 9 9 8 7 8 6 7 7 4 7 7.6 1.6
DE 7 7 7 7 9 6 9 7 8 9 – 11 7.9 1.4
CA 9 8 8 11 12 12 12 10 4 10 12 12 10.0 2.4
GB 11 10 11 10 11 11 11 11 10 11 11 9 10.6 0.7
AU 12 13 12 12 – – – 12 12 13 13 10 12.1 0.9
US 13 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 9 13 12.5 1.2
Correlation of index ranking with mean ranking (over all indexes):
 0.92 0.72 0.84 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.94 0.72 0.98 0.83 0.92  
SD: standard deviation.
G3: Gornick et al. (1997: 61) (children <3 years); G6: Gornick et al. (1997: 61) (children <6 years); G35: Gornick et al. (1997: 
61) (children 3–5 years); KO: Korpi (2000: 33) (dual-earner support); GM5: Gornick and Meyers (2003: 320) (children <6 years); 
GM6+: Gornick and Meyers (2003: 320) (children ⩾6 years); GM: Gornick and Meyers (2003: 320) (all children); BA: Bambra (2004: 
207); FE: Ferrarini (2006); MS: Mandel and Shalev (2009: 1885); KR: Kröger (2011: 432); KO+: Korpi et al. (2013; n = 13) (n = 11 in 
Gornick and Meyers, 2003 and Kröger, 2011, rank multiplied by 13/11).
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contrast, Gornick et al. include numerous indicators 
of childcare policies.
Aside from the different country rankings, Table 2 
provides information on the association of rankings in 
single studies with the mean ranking across all studies. 
Given the large differences in conceptual approaches 
and indicator choices and the wide variation in the 
ranking of single countries, the rather high correlation 
of most studies may come as a surprise. The majority 
of rankings are highly correlated with the overall mean 
ranking (r > 0.9). In only two cases (Gornick and 
Meyers, 2003 (3–5-year-olds); Ferrarini, 2006), corre-
lation coefficients near 0.7 indicate a lower agreement 
with the rankings in other studies. The correlations 
should, however, not detract from the large differences 
observed between the studies’ country rankings for 
single countries, which point to crucial divergences 
between the conceptual and empirical approaches of 
comparing family policy constellations. Not least, this 
poses a major limitation on the systematic evaluation 
of developments in family policy configurations over 
time.
Construction of indices of 
defamilization and familization
After having evaluated previous studies’ approaches of 
measuring defamilization and familization across 
countries, we consider how the dimensions outlined in 
section ‘Patterns of familizing and defamilizing poli-
cies’ can be measured with the data currently available 
for a larger set of countries. We consulted several 
available data sources of international family policy 
indicators which provide indicators over several years, 
such as the Comparative Family Policy Database 
(Gauthier, 2011), the Multilinks Database (Keck and 
Saraceno, 2012), complementary databases to the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) assembled on the 
LIS website,12 the OECD Family Database (OECD, 
2012a) and the OECD Social Expenditures Database 
(OECD, 2012b).13 Annual indicators with which some 
of the conceptual dimensions could be operationalized 
for a large number of countries and a relatively long 
period of time (starting in the 1980s–1990s) can be 
derived from OECD sources on one hand and the 
Comparative Family Policy Database on the other 
hand. The OECD Social Expenditure Database 
contains longitudinal information on spending for 
family services as a percentage of the country’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) from 1980, which may be 
used as an indicator for defamilizing policies. The 
Comparative Family Database includes an indicator 
for the level of child allowances paid to families cover-
ing a longer time span, which is suitable as a measure 
of familizing policy. Using these single indicators can, 
however, only give a very limited, one-dimensional 
view on countries’ patterns of familizing and defami-
lizing policies. We also found problematic irregulari-
ties in the OECD spending data series in the 1990s, 
which point to changes in the coding or underlying 
concepts. In conclusion, we found that the policy 
dimensions of defamilization and familization can cur-
rently be captured most adequately with indicators 
from the Multilinks Database (Keck and Saraceno, 
2012). On the downside, this database is limited to 
2 years (2004 and 2009), which led us to focus on con-
structing comprehensive, but cross-sectional indices. 
Although we had to relax some of our standards for the 
data, we are able to cover the theoretically crucial 
dimensions of intergenerational and gender dependen-
cies between family members, extending the scope of 
previous empirical studies. Multilinks provides indica-
tors on family policies and legal regulations, covering 
27 EU member states (as of 2011) as well as Georgia, 
Norway and Russia. We restricted our selection to 
2004 indicators to maximize the country sample 
because some of the indicators were not available for 
both years, which resulted in the range of measures 
listed in Table 3. We suggest nine policy categories for 
defamilizing and six for familizing policies.
These policy indicators were then used for the 
composite defamilization and familization indices. 
To standardize the indicator scales, we divided values 
by the observed maximum (Gornick and Meyers, 
2003)14 and transformed dichotomous variables as 0 
and 1 scores. We then added the single scores together 
to composite indices for defamilizing and familizing 
policies, respectively. Our final sample consists of 
the following 21 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. In Figure 2, 
the countries are plotted on the dimensions of 
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familizing and defamilizing policies.15 We also added 
the labels of the ideal-typical outcomes of family 
policy configurations illustrated in Figure 1. These 
are meant to provide a general impression of the ori-
entation of the countries, not to define their exact 
location. We can see that in 2004, Sweden, Finland, 
Norway and Belgium, together with Estonia, come 
closest to a policy configuration supporting individu-
alism (see also Daly, 2011b). There are no countries 
in our sample with strong policy support for both 
individualism and familialism, that is, leaving the 
option for either of the models. However, there are a 
Table 3. Indicators used for de-/familization indices.
Defamilizing policies Familizing policies
Early years care Allowances and taxes
  (1) Individual entitlement to childcare for children 
under 3 years (yes/no), (2) coverage rate for children 
under 3 years (share of children aged 0–2 years), (3) full-
time childcare usage of children under 3 years (share of 
children aged 0–2 years), (4) coverage rate for children 
aged 3–5 years (share of children aged 3–5 years)
  (1) Eligibility condition for child allowance: Universal 
benefit (yes/no), (2) child allowance for one child 
(share of net average income), (3) child allowance 
for three children (share of net average income), 
(4) tax deduction or tax credit for children (yes/no)
Elderly care Parental leave
  (1) Access to care services (yes/no), (2) home-based 
care service recipients (share of population aged 
65 and older), (3) persons living in care institutions 
(share of population aged 65 years and older)
  (1) Length of unpaid leave (months; constructed as 
the sum of maternity leave and parental leave minus 
the months of paid leave)
Parental leave Support of the elderly
  (1) Length of well-paid leave (months), (2) duration 
of paternity leave (days)
  (1) Children’s legal obligation to support parents 
(yes/no)
Figure 2. Familization and defamilization across countries 2004, composite indices.
Additive indices from six (familization) and seven (defamilization) policy measures, respectively. Indicators standardized by division 
of single values by the observed maximum. Data from Multilinks (see also Table 3).
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few countries like France and Germany which, to 
some extent, combine familizing and defamilizing 
policies. Austria, Slovenia and Latvia can be said to 
feature the most familialist family policy landscape 
in our sample in 2004. Although scoring lower than 
Germany on the familization index, none of the three 
countries provides defamilizing policies. Countries 
such as Spain, Ireland, Great Britain and Greece 
score rather low on both policy dimensions. We 
argued that the provision of both weak familizing 
policies and weak defamilizing policies creates pat-
terns of implicit individualism or implicit familialism 
depending on the predominant family ideals. Not 
showing a strong degree of familizing or defamiliz-
ing policies, other countries such as Poland still lean 
more towards either of the two directions. Hungary 
and Latvia score higher on familizing policies, while 
the Czech Republic and Portugal exhibit stronger 
defamilizing policies. Other countries, most promi-
nently the Netherlands plotted in the middle of our 
graph, come out as ambiguous cases.
Discussion
The starting point for this article was the observation 
that the concepts of familization and defamilization 
are often used in comparative welfare state research, 
but that the translation of the concepts into empirical 
measures has had limited success in previous studies. 
Based on an extensive review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature, we have derived a conceptual 
framework and proposed indicators for operationaliza-
tion. In the conceptual approach, we regarded dimen-
sions of familizing and defamilizing policies in terms 
of intergenerational and gender-specific dependencies 
of individuals towards their families. The article pro-
poses measuring familization and defamilization at the 
policy level, rather than at the country level. This 
makes it possible to consider both countries’ familiz-
ing and defamilizing policies, which often exist along-
side each other and develop in different, but not always 
congruent directions over time. In addition, rather than 
defining the policy outcomes as familialism and defa-
milialism, we follow Daly (2011a; 2011b) in assuming 
that individualism is the outcome category of defami-
lizing and familizing policies that opposes familialism. 
Both of these, we argue, will vary across countries 
according to the cultural legacies in organizing depend-
ency relationships in families. The article’s discussion 
of previous empirical studies, then, demonstrates the 
variety of approaches and divergence in how countries 
are ranked on a familization–defamilization contin-
uum. In a final step, we propose indices of familizing 
and defamilizing policies which capture the multi-
dimensionality of both concepts using current institu-
tional data for a larger set of European countries. Using 
these indices, we can see that these countries exhibit 
family policy patterns that implicitly or explicitly sup-
port individualist or familialist family models. We do 
not find countries clearly falling into the category of 
support for optional individualism or optional familial-
ism. However, the main focus of this exercise was 
directed less on substantial and more on practical 
issues. Operationalizing complex constructs such as 
defamilization is still hampered by a lack of data. 
Although data availability in the field of family policy 
has improved over the last few years, constraints pre-
vail. Despite advances in recent years, there is still a 
lack of indicators for depicting change in family policy 
over time. In addition, in some areas, such as the qual-
ity and the costs of childcare or intergenerational 
dependencies, data availability is a bigger problem 
than in others. The situation clearly differs from other 
policy fields where discussion has moved from the 
question of the sheer availability of data to detailed 
issues about data quality (Danforth and Stephens, 
2013). Valid and reliable data are the essential require-
ments for mapping the range and the trajectories of 
European countries’ family policy constellations.
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Notes
 1. Gornick and Meyers (2003) argue that two feminist 
‘vantage points’ can be differentiated in the context 
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of welfare state research: the ‘sameness/employment’ 
and the ‘difference/care’ perspectives (p. 84). The 
debates around the de-/familization concepts also 
reflect this division.
 2. Esping-Andersen refers to Saraceno (1997) who cites 
McLaughlin and Glendinning (1994).
 3. This is partly due the fact that the term ‘defamili-
zation’ is formed in direct analogy to ‘decommodi-
fication’. If the latter is – in Karl Polanyi’s words 
– described as ‘taking labour out of the market’, one 
could say that defamilization is about ‘taking labour 
– or to be more precise unpaid work – out of the 
family’.
 4. Although not a defining criterion for strong defami-
lization, the quality of childcare can also be assumed 
to be an important factor because it will determine 
parents’ willingness to use the services. A common 
measure of childcare quality is the staff–child ratio/
group size. Also, school regulations (e.g. compulsory 
school age) and schedules can be considered part of 
this category because they can likewise reduce paren-
tal time spent on care and education (Gornick and 
Meyers, 2003).
 5. Another way around the difficulties of accounting for 
market-based services would be to consider different 
kinds of financial compensation.
 6. While acknowledging the interrelatedness of policies 
and outcomes – policies that affect outcomes and out-
comes can have effects on policies – we focus on the 
one-directional, former relationship without going 
into detail about reciprocal effects.
 7. Korpi (2000) uses the country rankings in both dimen-
sions to construct a typology of ‘gender policy models’. 
Besides a dual-earner-support- and a general-family-
support model, he distinguishes countries which follow 
a market-oriented approach. The latter group consists 
of countries that rank low in both dimensions.
 8. Gornick et al. (1997) had previously outlined a simi-
lar approach. The concepts are based on Crompton 
(1999).
 9. There is also evidence which indicates differences in 
the effect of parental leaves by duration and level of the 
replacement rate (see, for example, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
1995: 188).
10. Child–staff ratios may also be considered as a policy 
output.
11. The selection of countries partly reflects the fact that 
Eurostat and the OECD are the main data producers 
in this field of research.
12. See http://www.lisdatacenter.org/resources/other-data 
bases/
13. Family policy indicators are currently also compiled 
for a larger number of countries in the Social Policy 
Indicator Database (SPIN), for example, detailed data 
on child benefits (Ferrarini et al., 2013), but data are 
not yet publicly available.
14. We also used z-standardization as sensitivity analysis, 
which produced substantially similar results.
15. The position of countries in the plot area is highly 
sensitive to the inclusion of single policy indicators.
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